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Thread-Based Obfuscation through Control-Flow Mangling
Rasha Salah Omar1, Ahmed El-Mahdy2, Erven Rohou3
Abstract
The increasing use of cloud computing and remote execution have made program security especially important.
Code obfuscation has been proposed to make the understanding of programs more complicated to attackers. In this
paper, we exploit multi-core processing to substantially increase the complexity of programs, making reverse engi-
neering more complicated. We propose a novel method that automatically partitions any serial thread into an arbitrary
number of parallel threads, at the basic-block level. The method generates new control-flow graphs, preserving the
blocks’ serial successor relations and guaranteeing that one basic-block is active at a time using guards. The method
generates mn different combinations for m threads and n basic-blocks, significantly complicating the execution state.
We provide a correctness proof for the algorithm and implement the algorithm in the LLVM compilation framework.
Keywords: Security, Obfuscation, Multi-threading.
1. Introduction
With the advent of cloud computing, software se-
curity becomes especially important [1]. In particu-
lar, software security researchers have been concerned
to evaluate the methods that protect software systems
against reverse engineering threats. Those can be ex-
ploited by software hackers to discover the software vul-
nerabilities and inject malicious code.
One practical security approach is to use software
obfuscation; it is a software security mechanism that
transforms the original program into a functionally-
equivalent counterpart [2, 3]; the obfuscated program
has the same semantics as the original, but it is much
more complex to understand by reverse engineers [4].
Parallelism and multi-threading have been proposed
to increase performance. Parallel programs are notori-
ously difficult to debug and reason about, and for that
reason parallelism is a nice ingredient for obfuscation.
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This paper proposes a new obfuscation technique
based on control-flow restructuring and multi-threading.
The method allows for arbitrary distribution of basic-
blocks to an arbitrary number of threads. Thus for m
threads and n basic-blocks, there are exactly mn differ-
ent distributions. The method uses guards to transfer
execution from one thread to another, thus guaranteeing
sequential execution semantics. To some extent, these
guards can be seen as the key to rebuilding the original
code, and they can be obfuscated by standard methods,
such as splitting each code block into multiple blocks
(only according to its data dependence). Furthermore,
dummy processes could be inserted to the parallel code.
Our method has the following advantages:
• it makes static analysis more complex – if not im-
possible – as the actual control-flow is mangled
and hidden;
• it allows for generation of different versions of
the same program (software diversity), thereby in-
creasing the resilience of versions to attacks;
• the method is generally independent from other
control-flow obfuscation methods, and thereby it
can be combined for increased complexity.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews
related control-flow obfuscation methods. Section 3
describes our thread-based obfuscation method, illus-
trating it with a simple example, and provides a gen-
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eral correctness proof for the method. Section 4 dis-
cusses the obfuscation and performance implications of
the method. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
According to Collberg et al. [3], software obfuscation
is classified into three categories. The first one, operat-
ing at source code level, consists in lexical transforma-
tions, shuffling the code identifiers and getting rid of
the comments and debugging information. The second
category applies data transformations, with the main fo-
cus on data layout change. Finally, the third category is
the control-flow transformations, aiming at making the
control-flow unintelligible from the attackers [3, 5]. The
technique we propose fits in this latter category.
2.1. Parallel Control-Flow Obfuscation
Control-flow obfuscation is a method to obscure the
actual control-flow of the code, without changing the
semantics of the original code. Control-flow transfor-
mation itself is divided into three subcategories. Aggre-
gation breaks up logically dependent portions of code
and merges the independent portions. Ordering alters
the order of computations of the code. Finally, Compu-
tations inserts dummy code or make obscure changes to
the source by inserting supplementary dummy compu-
tations so as to further confuse the attacker [3].
The computation transformation includes methods
such as insertion of dead or irrelevant code, extension
to loop conditions, and conversion of a reducible into
a non-reducible flow graph. One of the most important
methods to do this is to increase parallelism of the code
by two methods. First, redundant non-profitable task
can be created then a portion of code is paralleled with
this task, so the hacker cannot deduce which thread will
have the actual portion to be run. Second, a sequence
of data dependent statements in a portion of code can
be splitted, then they run in parallel. The control for the
correct execution will be using synchronization primi-
tives [6]. The latter is the closest to our method, how-
ever it splits simple, in-order sequence of instructions
(without control-flow dependence) rather than general,
complex, control-flow graphs as per our method.
Hsin-Yi Tsai, Yu-Lun Huang, and David wagner [7]
proposed a quantitative analysis framework through us-
ing control-flow graphs after applying some obfusca-
tion transformations. In their study, code parallelization
makes it more difficult for reverse-engineers to com-
prehend the main purpose of the software. Moreover,
there were two proposed solutions. First, splitting each
code block into multiple blocks, but only according to
its data dependence. Second, dummy processes could
be inserted to the parallel code [3].
3. Embedding Control-Flow into Multiple Threads
Our proposed method aims to obscure code running
in hostile environments, such as cloud systems, by di-
viding its actual single thread control-flow graph into
multiple control-flow graphs which run separately in
threads. The real semantics of the program is guaran-
teed by using synchronization primitives. These prim-
itives consists of a guard for each basic-block in each
control-flow that waits until it is set to be executed. For
m threads and n basic-blocks, the number of combina-
tions for this algorithm reaches mn that provides more
security. The algorithm works on basic-block level and
it confirms that only one basic-block runs at a time and
in its original order.
We explain in this section all specifics of the proposed
approach. Starting from the algorithm main steps fol-
lowed by its correctness proof and finally an example to
clearly elucidate our work.
3.1. Our Obfuscation Algorithm
In our proposed algorithm we have four main steps.
The first step decomposes the base control-flow graph
basic-blocks, randomly, among a given number of sets.
The second step computes the immediate successors for
each basic-block in the same set. Note that the origi-
nal successor of a block may be moved to a different
thread, and control returns to the former thread only at
a later block. The third step inserts guards before each
basic-block to prevent it from running before its actual
serial execution sequence. Finally, the fourth step gen-
erates corresponding, new, parallel functions (threads),
each containing one of the basic-block sets. We also en-
sure that each function contains only one entry and end
basic-block.
We use the Informal Compiler Algorithm Notation
(ICAN) format [8] for describing our algorithm. The
first and fourth steps are generally straightforward. We
therefore focus here on steps two and three.
Step 2 is concerned with computing immediate suc-
cessors; the number of successors varies from 1 to
many, depending on the distribution of the basic-blocks.
The procedure of GetImmdediateSuccessor, shown
in Algorithm 1, is used to determine the new succes-
sors in each function for each basic-block. It is called
on each basic-block of the original control-flow graph,
BaseCFG. It computes the immediate successor set, Re-
sult, for an input basic-block set, BBcur, a basic-block
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1 procedure GetImmediateSuccessors (BBcur,
BBset, BaseCFG)
2 BBcur :in BBType
3 BBset : in BBsetType
4 BaseCFG : in CFGType
5 Result : out BBsetType
6 begin
7 BB : BBsetType
8 BB := { BBcur }
9 seenBefore : BBsetType
10 seenBefore := φ
12 while BB , φ do
13 I := baseImmediateSuccessor(BB , BaseCFG)
14 Result ∪ := I ∩ BBset
15 mayNext := I − BBset ∩ I
16 BB := mayNext − seenBefore
17 seenBefore ∪ := mayNext
18 end
19 end
Algorithm 1: GetImmediateSuccessor
partition set, BBSet, and the original control-flow graph,
BaseCFG.
Generally, an immediate successor can belong to
other basic-block partitions; however, an immediate
successor of which can, recursively, belong to the cur-
rent set. Therefore, the algorithm keeps track of all such
blocks in a temporary set, BB, and iteratively adds new
such blocks. Initially, the BB is intialised to BBcur (line
8), iteratively seen blocks are removed.
The line 12 iterates till BB is empty. It becomes
empty when we exhaustively visit all possible imme-
diate successors blocks (that belong to the current par-
tition, BBset). In line 13, we get the immediate succes-
sor of all BB elements and store into the set I. In line
14, we intersect the current partition, BBset, with I to
partial immediate successors, storing them into Result.
In line 15, we compute possible predecessors by com-
puting the difference between I and the intersection be-
tween I and BBset (currently obtained immediate suc-
cessor) and store the result into mayNext. In line 16,
we filter the already visited predecessors, seenBefore,
and update BB. Finally, in line 17, we append the al-
ready visited predecessors into the seenBefore to avoid
visiting in later iterations.
The execution of each basic-block is guarded by a
flag associated with it. After finishing the execution of
a basic-block, the current next successor block’s flag is
set to 1. The control-flow then switches to the correct
successor depending on the values of flags (ie, the one
with the flag set to 1). We, therefore, need to insert
a switching basic-block for that purpose. In particular,
we insert two new basic-blocks; the first is a Wait block,
that waits for any successor flag to be 1. The next block
performs the switching part, SwitchBasicBlock.
The variables used in the original program and the
flags introduced as guards have to be made volatile, as
well as, global to be visible for all newly created func-
tions. Furthermore, we should care that these global
variables are read in right way.
Hardware cache coherence will guarantee that corre-
sponding cache lines are properly invalidated and val-
ues updated at readers’ locations. This mechanism has
a cost, which may be worsened in case of false sharing.
To minimize it, we force a large alignment for every
global variable.
3.2. Proof of Correctness
The proposed algorithm was proved in three main
points.
Firstly, every basic-block in the new partitions maps
to one and only one of the old basic-blocks. According
to each iteration, there is only one basic-block that is
set into only one partition. Every partition takes each
basic-block from the BaseCFG for once.
Secondly, the immediate successor could be reached
from each basic-block and every partition should be
waiting for the immediate successor of the current
basic-block. Initially all threads are waiting on the dom-
inant set of basic-blocks that belong to its partition and
reachable from the BaseCFG entry node. After execut-
ing a basic-block, the thread waits on all dominant set
basic-blocks that belong to its partition following execu-
tion of the executable basic-block. Therefore all threads
are always waiting on the current dominant set of basic-
blocks in its partition. Then, the dominant set is updated
after executing each basic-block in its partition. In other
words, each thread is waiting on all its basic-blocks to
define a dominant basic-block such that no basic-block
should be executed before first execution of the domi-
nant basic-block. The dominant set is determined ac-
cording to the BaseCFG.
Finally, there is only one basic-block which can be
active at a time. Each basic-block in each partition
has a guard that determines when it could be active.
According to the original sequence of instructions, be-
fore each basic-block being active, the corresponding
guard should be set and once the basic-block finish its
work, this guard should be reset and the next basic-
block should be activated using the same criteria.
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3.3. Simple Example to Our Proposed Approach
We illustre here with a simple example the effect of
applying our algorithm on a (naive) program that com-
putes prime numbers. The pseudo-code of the program
is written as following:
function checkPrime
begin
for counter in range(0, 100000)
begin
flag = 0
for i in range (2, counter / 2)
begin
if (counter % i == 0)
begin
flag = 1
break
end
end
if(flag == 0)
print "prime"
else
print "not a prime"
end
end
end
The original serial program’s control-flow graph is
shown in Fig. 1. The program consists of 16 basic-
blocks, two loops, and a number of branches.
The obfuscating process computes the basic-blocks
of the program and randomly divides them into a num-
ber of sets. In our example, we divided it into four sets,
randomly. Furthermore, each set contains different ran-
dom number of original basic-blocks. In addition, the
edges are constructed to get the new control-flow graphs
with new guards each time according to the new sets.
The result for the algorithm application to the pro-
gram is shown in Fig. 2a, Fig. 2b, Fig. 2c and Fig.
2d.
3.4. Implementation
To further validate the algorithm, we have imple-
mented it on the LLVM compilation framework [9].
We added a new transformation pass that uses Pthreads
to generate parallel threads. The system is used on a
simple kernels to validate the correctness of the algo-
rithm. The kernels included calculating even numbers,
Fibonacci sequence, and prime numbers. The imple-
mentation is not optimised for performance, which is a
subject for future work.
Figure 1: The Original Program CFG in the Example
4. Discussion
4.1. Resilience and Potency
The key, what the attacker is looking for, is the dis-
tribution order. This information can be reconstructed
from writes into global variables at the end of basic-
blocks and active waits at the beginning of blocks. Even
though we did not implement it so far, additional pro-
tection would hide these accesses, for example by ac-
cessing the variables through pointers (the insight is that
alias analysis is a difficult problem), or by reusing the
same location when we can prove they are never used at
the same time.
Static reverse engineering is therefore much more dif-
ficult, if not impossible. Dynamic analysis would be
similar in spirit to what one would do on the sequential
code, but with many more threads need to be tracked.
We could also use races to make the analysis even more
complicated, and confuse automatic tools.
Moreover, we increase the dimension space for an at-
tacker as the method is highly independent on other ob-
fuscation methods. Thereby the use of threading effec-
tively increases the dimensionality of the space, result-
ing in an exponential increase in complexity.
4.2. Cost
According to the splitting of the program, the ob-
fuscated program is significantly slower than the orig-
inal. Generally, the obfuscation effect on the program
4
(a) Obfuscated Re-
sult:CFG1
(b) Obfuscated Result:CFG2
(c) Obfuscated Result:CFG3
(d) Obfuscated Result:CFG4
Figure 2: One Example of Obfuscated CFGs
depends on the communication via memory. Thus, per-
formance degrades and cost increases as well.
The naive implementation incurs between one and
two orders of magnitude slowdown. This is due to the
cost of communication between threads (and possibly
false sharing). Another cost is due to the use of global
variables and the lack of register promotion at this time.
4.3. Perspective
One approach to hide the cost, is only obfuscate
critical functions such as password checking function.
However, for general intellectual property performance-
critical functions general performance improvement is
highly sought.
The main performance bottleneck is communicat-
ing values across threads. For threads residing on the
same core, the wait spins on a shared flag, thereby in-
creasing the memory demand. Careful spin-wait op-
timisations (such as the use of the pause instruction
in the x86 architecture) improves performance. For
threads residing on different cores, the cost would in-
clude communicating across the cache hierarchy. Typ-
ically, such spin-waits are 10-20 times slower than L1
cache accesses, and therefore the choice of basic-blocks
can be constraint by corresponding performance thresh-
olds. Thereby trading-off some obfuscation complex-
ity to gain speed. Another possible optimization is to
promote global variables into registers (register promo-
tions) for specific code regions with no external modifi-
cations for shared variables.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
This paper proposes a novel method that mangles any
control-flow graph into many threads; the mangling is
done randomly, without data-flow or control-flow de-
pendence constraints. The method exploits the com-
plexity inherent in parallel programming and debugging
to obfuscate program. The method is capable of gener-
ating mn different decompositions on m threads and n
basic-blocks (in the original control-flow graph). The
main aim of the paper is to present a preliminary study
of the proposed method, focusing on the correctness,
and the performance degradation extend. The correct-
ness is validated by a proof, as well as by testing a real
LLVM-based implementation. Naive implementation is
performance bounded by the thread-to-thread commu-
nication through the cache hierarchy, resulting in up to
10-20 times slowdown.
Future work would focus on improving the per-
formance throughout extending the liveness analysis
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across threads, thereby allowing for register allocations
for some variables that are not communicated across
threads. Moreover, from the point view of obfuscation,
interesting future work would be to obfuscate multiple
program threads at the same time; that would allow for a
mangled concurrent execution state, resulting in further
complexity.
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